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Abstract 
This paper argues that Jonathan Edwards developed idealism from the instruction he received 
and conveyed in logic, ethics, physics and metaphysics. His view of the direct perception of 
mind with its ideas and the indirect perception of matter provided the basis for a dualism 
between mind and matter and the necessary condition of the distinction between the ideal and 
the material world.1 
 
A Perennially Intriguing Problem 
Jonathan Edwards is generally acknowledged to be one of the most prominent 
American philosophers. Although much scholarship has been devoted to his idealism, 
Norman Fiering calls “the sources of Edwards’ youthful metaphysical idealism, that 
perennially intriguing problem in American intellectual history.”2 In this paper I seek to 
show how Edwards’ idealism grew out of his studies, teaching and research. His writings 
show his endorsement of early eighteenth-century notions and experiments, and from this 
general philosophical framework Edwards developed idealism––just as John Norris, Arthur 
Collier, George Berkeley, (the American) Samuel Johnson and a host of other contemporary 
thinkers did something similar.3 His arrival at or development of idealism is thus not 
intriguing, if by “intriguing” is meant something remarkable or curious.  
                                                
1 The author is grateful for comments on earlier drafts of this material from Profs. Oliver Crisp, Paul 
Helm, Kenneth Minkema, Richard Muller, Douglas Sweeney, Dr. Jasper Reid, the Jonathan Edwards Centre 
at the Heidelberg University, the higher seminar for theoretical philosophy at the department of philosophy, 
Gothenburg University, and a philosophy seminar at L’Abri, Mölle. 
2 Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1981), 35. Cf. “the mystery of Edward’s idealism,” Wallace E. Anderson, “Immaterialism 
in Jonathan Edwards’ Early Philosophical Notes,” Journal of the History of Ideas 25 (1964): 181.  
3 John Norris, An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701; rep. New York & London: 
Garland, 1978); Arthur Collier, Clavis Universalis: or, a New Inquiry after Truth, Being a Demonstration of the Non-
existence or Impossibility of an External World (London: Robert Gosling, 1713); George Berkeley, Of the Principles of 
Human Knowledge (1710) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), ed. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop, vol. 
2, The Works of George Berkeley (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1949); and Samuel Johnson, Elementa 
philosophica (Philadelphia: B. Franklin and D. Hall, 1752). Norris is a transitional figure here, but is arguably an 
idealist: Charles J. McCracken, “Stages on a Cartesian Road to Immaterialism,” Journal of the History of 
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Earlier Research into Edwards’ Idealism 
The problem of Edwards’ idealism seems partly to be perennial because of 
misunderstandings in earlier scholarship. In this section I seek to straighten out some of 
these.  
Edwards formulated his ontology most succinctly in the following way: “all existence is 
perception.”4 Paul Ramsey, Perry Miller, William Morris and Sang Hyun Lee flatly 
contradict this by claiming that “Jonathan Edwards’ idealism was not Berkeley’s ‘to be is to 
be perceived.’”5 Edwards’ consistent adherence to the view that existence is perception 
throughout his life has similarly been denied.6 Even if this did not contradict the many 
references to Edwards’ writings above, it would not be strange if Edwards did not express 
his view throughout his life, since he hesitated to publish his idealism for fear of opposition.7 
Theodore Hornberger notes that Edwards’ use of “familiar analogies and dialectic” made 
“the average reader” interpret him “as utterly untouched by any speculation outside of 
Scriptural exegesis.”8 Although Edwards probably did not know that the former Yale tutor 
Samuel Johnson had to defend his idealism in correspondence between 1745 and 1747,9 he 
must have guessed that idealism would upset his colleagues and parishioners generally. 
According to Anderson, “for all his reluctance to submit the claim to public scrutiny in his 
published writings, Edwards seems to have remained fast in his conviction that 
consciousness, involving perception and knowledge, is necessary for the existence of 
anything whatever.”10 
                                                                                                                                                       
Philosophy 24 (1986): 34; and W. J. Mander, The Philosophy of John Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
91-98. 
4 “Notes on Knowledge and Existence,” WJE 6:398. Similar statements are found, for example, in “Of 
Being,” WJE 6:204, 206; “The Mind” nos. 1, 9, 34, 40, 45, 51, 62, WJE 6: 337, 342, 353, 356-57, 363-64, 368, 380; 
“Miscellanies” nos. f, pp, 45, 94, 179, 247, WJE 13:166, 188, 226, 258, 327, 360. Idealism is also implicit in Edwards’ 
published writings: Freedom of the Will, WJE 1:183; and Original Sin, WJE 3:404. 
5 WJE 8:566, n. 1; cf. Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1949), 62; 
William S. Morris, The Young Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstruction (1991; rep. Eugene, Ore.: Wipf & Stock, 2005), 
366, 585; Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, Expanded Ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 93. 
6 Egbert C. Smyth, “Some Early Writings of Jonathan Edwards,” American Antiquarian Society 10 (1895): 
232; similarly, H. N. Gardiner, “The Early Idealism of Jonathan Edwards,” The Philosophical Review 9 (1900): 591. 
7  Note, for instance, the introductions to “Natural Philosophy” and “Of the Prejudices of the 
Imagination” in WJE 6: 192-95, 196-98. 
8 “The Effect of the New Science upon the Thought of Jonathan Edwards,” American Literature 9, no. 2 
(1937): 201. 
9 See John Ryder, “Cadwallader Colden, Samuel Johnson, and the Activity of Matter: Materialism and 
Idealism in Colonial America,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 32, no. 2 (1996): 248-72. 
10 “Introduction,” WJE 6:29; similarly, pp. 26, 68, 76. 
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If these misunderstandings can be left aside, then we can focus on the background of 
Edwards’ idealism. Here many scholars have defended the influence of one thinker on 
Edwards.11 Their source material is scarce and the argument reductionist. Contrary to a mass 
of research it has recently even been claimed of Edwards “not having any firsthand 
knowledge of the main figures of Western philosophy.”12 According to Fiering’s apt 
description: “Edwards has been too often pictured as an isolated mental giant, nourished 
only by the near-miraculous circumstance of his early exposure to Locke and Newton. 
Instead he ought to be seen in the larger context of the Atlantic intellectual community in 
the first half of the eighteenth century.”13  
Still, a disproportionate amount of research has in particular been spent on Edwards’ 
possible relation to Berkeley. Although Lyon’s claim in L’Idealisme that Edwards relied on 
Berkeley is generally discredited, their similarities still tempt scholars to find a connection. 
For example, Edwards’ writings indicate, according to Anderson, that he had read George 
Berkeley’s An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) sometime between 1726 and 1729.14 
However, although it paved the way for Berkeley’s developed idealism in Of the Principles of 
Human Knowledge (1710), his New Theory of Vision appears not to have been as influential as 
has sometimes been claimed: “In sum, the alleged success of Berkeley’s theory of vision 
must be seen as the success of a severely truncated version of his theory.”15 Marsden suggests 
with a reference to Minkema that “Edwards may have even met Berkeley on a trip to 
Newport in 1731”, but Minkema says nothing about such a meeting.16 Still, contrary to 
Smyth and Miller, Berkeley’s A New Theory of Vision as well as his Principles and Alciphron are 
                                                
11 For example, Georges Henri Joseph Lyon (L'Idéalisme en Angleterre au XVIIIe siècle [Paris: Alcan, 1888], 
406-46) singled out George Berkeley; John H. MacCracken (“The Sources of Jonathan Edwards's Idealism,” 
The Philosophical Review 11, no. 1 [1902]) isolated Arthur Collier; Clarence Gohdes (“Aspects of Idealism in 
Early New England,” The Philosophical Review 39 [1930]) settled on Theophilus Gale; Perry Miller (Jonathan 
Edwards, esp. 54-61) nominated John Locke; Morris (Young Edwards) picked out Franco Burgersdijk and Adrian 
Heereboord; Charles J. McCracken (Malebranche and British Philosophy [Oxford: Clarendon, 1983], esp. 329-340) 
and Paul Copan (“Jonathan Edwards's philosophical influences: Lockean or Malebranchean?,” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 44, [2001]) selected Nicolas Malebranche. 
12  Miklos Vetö, “Edwards and Philosophy,” in Understanding Jonathan Edwards: An Introduction to 
America's Theologian, ed. Gerald R. McDermott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 153, approved by 
Magdalena Sevcikova, “Alternative viewpoint: Edwards and Philosophy,” ibid., 171. 
13 Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 13-14. 
14 “Introduction,” WJE 6:36, 100, 123-24. 
15 Margaret Atherton, “Berkeley's Theory of Vision and Its Reception,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Berkeley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 121; cf. Egbert C. Smyth, “The ‘New Philosophy’ 
Against which Students at Yale College were Warned in 1714,” American Antiquarian Society 11 (1896): 251-52. 
16 George M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 73, referring 
to Kenneth P. Minkema, “Jonathan Edwards's Defense of Slavery,” Massachusetts Historical Review 4 (2002): 23-
59.  Note of the editors, there is the possibility that JE could have sought out Berkeley while in Newport.  
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actually in Edwards’ reading list.17 However, Edwards never referred to Berkeley and none 
of his works are found in the “Account Book” where Edwards registered his books on loan 
to friends.18 Edwards most likely read Berkeley’s anonymous essays in the first volume of 
The Guardian he owned.19 Yet, Edwards’ concealment of his idealism from fear of opposition 
may be taken as evidence for his independent development. For if he had known in the 
formative years that a host of others had arrived at similar conclusions from the same 
sources, he could have appealed to them for acceptance. However, this is not to deny, for 
instance, that there are “remarkable” and “striking thematic continuities” between 
Berkeley’s objections to moral sense theory in Alciphron and Edwards’ ones in True Virtue20 
as well as notable parallels in their logic, physics and metaphysics. Yet, emphasis on the 
similarities can obscure the dissimilarities. For instance, whereas Berkeley refers to the 
overcoming of skepticism and atheism in the development of his idealism, Edwards does 
not.21 Edwards endorses while Berkeley rejects Locke’s account of abstraction.22 They held 
to reversed relations between the senses of sight and touch.23 Edwards writes that his natural 
philosophy is “exceedingly beside the ordinary way of thinking” but Berkeley says that his 
one is an “endeavour to vindicate Common Sense.”24 It is somewhat noteworthy in this 
connection that there is no evidence of any response by Edwards to (probably) the first 
comprehensive critique of Berkeley’s idealism by Andrew Baxter. Baxter published An 
Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul in 1733, and Edwards owned the third edition of 1745 
at least by 175125 and quoted it by 1754.26  
                                                
17 Smyth, “Early Writings,” 233; and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 61-62. “Catalogue” nos. 319, 318 (ca. 1726-
1728), 350 (ca. 1731-1735), WJE 26:184, 192. 
18 WJE 26: 319-56; cf. also Appendix D, WJE 26:430. 
19 Cf. WJE 26: 119-20, 331-32; and George Berkeley, “Essays in the Guardian,” Works, vol. 7 (1713; London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1955), esp. on the implicitly idealist, pp. 225-28. 
20 Richard A. S. Hall, “Did Berkeley Influence Edwards? Their Common Critique of the Moral Sense 
Theory,” in Jonathan Edwards's Writings: Text, Context, Interpretation, ed. Stephen J. Stein (Bloomington: 
Indiana Univ Press, 1996), 100, 105. 
21 Berkeley, Principles, § 92.  
22 “The Mind” nos. 7, 37, 41, WJE 6:340-41, 355, 359-61; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 1689), II.xi.9, II.xxii.1, 8; Berkeley, 
Principles, Introduction.  
23 Cf. WJE 6: 350, and George Berkeley, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, Works (1709; London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1949), § 1. 
24 “Natural Philosophy,” WJE 6:193; Berkeley, Dialogues III. 
25 Cf. WJE 26: 321.  
26 Freedom of Will, WJE 1:379, 386, 392. For Baxter’s argument, “Dean Berkeley’s scheme against the 
existence of matter, and a material world examined, and shewn inconclusive,” see An Enquiry into the Nature of 
the Human Soul, 2 vols. (3d ed., London: Millar, 1745), II:235-320. 
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In the hope of having cleared up some misunderstandings in earlier scholarship, 27 I 
think we can focus on the perennially intriguing problem of the sources of Edwards’ idealism. 
Building on a few helpful studies on Edwards’ intellectual development,28 I will in the next 
section attempt to show how Edwards’ idealism grew out of his studies, teaching and 
research. 
 
The Sources of Edwards’ idealism 
The scholarship on Edwards’ philosophical development has long suffered from the 
early editors’s mistaken dates of most of his early manuscripts.29 Fortunately, Thomas 
Schafer’s analyses of the early manuscripts during the last half of the twentieth century has 
led to a revision of their dates, and consequently to a (more) correct account of Edwards’ 
philosophical development.30  
“Records of Edwards’ reading are incomplete,”31 but the main scope of Edwards’ 
syllabus can be reconstructed from circumstantial evidence32 and the chief philosophical 
                                                
27 There are a number of other earlier publications on Edwards’ development of idealism, but to my mind 
they shed little light on the issue in question: Smyth, “Early Writings”; Smyth, “’New Philosophy’”; Smyth, 
“Jonathan Edwards’ Idealism with Special Reference to the Esay ‘Of Being’ and to Writings not in his 
Collected Works,” The American Journal of Theology, no. 4 (1897); Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 61-65; Elizabeth 
Flower and Murray G. Murphey, A History of Philosophy in America, 2 vols. (New York: Capricorn Books, 1977); 
McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, 329-40; Michael McClymond, Encounters with God: An Approach to 
the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (NewYork & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 33, 127-28, n. 45; Bruce 
Kuklick, A History of Philosophy in America: 1720-2000 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 5-25; Daniel, “Edwards 
as Philosopher”; and Roger A. Ward, “Jonathan Edwards and Eighteenth‐Century Religious Philosophy,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, ed. Cheryl J. Misak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4-6. 
28 Anderson, “Immaterialism,” and “Introduction”; Jasper Reid, “Jonathan Edwards on Space and God,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2003), and Jasper Reid, “The Metaphysics of Jonathan Edwards and David 
Hume,” Hume Studies 32 (2006). To date, the best studies for understanding Edwards’ general intellectual 
development are probably Anderson, “Introduction,” together with Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought,13-47; 
Norman Fiering, “The Rationalist Foundation of Jonathan Edwards's Metaphysics,” in Jonathan Edwards and 
the American Experience, ed. Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 91; 
Reid, “Edwards on Space and God”; and Thuesen, “Introduction.” One does, however, still come across 
rather dated presentations of Edwards’ philosophical influences and position: Morris, Young Edwards 
(following Smyth, e.g., p. 186); John E. Smith, Jonathan Edwards (London & Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1992), 14-28; Kuklick, History, 5-25, and Churchmen, 15-42; and Lee Philosophical Theology, 10-11. 
29 For example, Smyth “Early Writings.” 
30 Schafer, “Introduction,” in WJE 13:59-90. There are helpful suggestions throughout Anderson, 
“Introduction.” 
31 Ward, “Jonathan Edwards and Eighteenth‐Century Religious Philosophy,” 3-4. 
32 Richard Warch, School of the Prophets: Yale College, 1701-1740 (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 1973); Edwin Oviatt, The Beginnings of Yale 1701-1726 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916); Brooks 
Mather Kelley, Yale: A History (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974), 11-36; and John C. 
Schwab, “The Yale College Curriculum 1701-1901,” Educational Review 22 (1901): 1-5. Fine accounts of Edwards’ 
studies are found in Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 23-33; and Anderson, “Introduction,” WJE 6:7-34. For 
some social and material circumstances of his studies, see Wilson H. Kimnach and Kenneth P. Minkema, “The 
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influences can be inferred from his (early) writings.33 Edwards’ B.A. curriculum seems to have 
been almost identical with the Harvard one described by the tutor Henry Flynt in 1723, and 
his M.A. course seems to have been by individual arrangement just like the Harvard one.34 
His studies thus agreed most likely with the Harvard College education of his father and 
grammar school teacher Timothy Edwards as well as of his Yale tutor and cousin Elisha 
Williams.35 During the second half of the seventeenth century, Harvard had abandoned a 
traditional or broadly Aristotelian curriculum and adopted a modern or roughly Cartesian 
curriculum.36 At Yale, Williams was hostile towards traditional logic and metaphysics, and 
assigned modern textbooks to Edwards,37 which the latter inherited from his father’s studies 
at Harvard.38 Edwards’ context seems to have had many similarities with that group of 
seventeenth-century thinkers associated with the University of Cambridge (rather inaptly 
called “Cambridge Platonists”) who endorsed Cartesian dualism in anthropology and 
corpuscularianism in physics.39 His undergraduate course progressed from logic and ethics 
                                                                                                                                                       
Material and Social Practices of Intellectual Work: Jonathan Edwards’ Study,” The William and Mary Quarterly 
69, no. 4 (2012). On learned culture generally in the early American Enlightenment, see, for instance, John 
Corrigan, The Prism of Piety: Catholick Congregational Clergy at the Beginning of the Enlightenment (New York & 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); and David D. Hall, “Learned Culture in the Eighteenth Century,” in 
A History of the Book in America: The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World, ed. Hugh Amory and David D. Hall 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
33 WJE 16: 32-33, 37-38; WJE 6 and 13. In addition, he recorded books of interest in his “Catalogue,” which 
are analysed in Thuesen, “Introduction,” WJE 26, superseding the dated Thomas H. Johnson, “Jonathan 
Edwards’ Background of Reading,” Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts 28 (1935): 193-222; and 
Morris, Young Edwards, 219-86.  
34 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Tercentennial History of Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, 4 vols. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), I:146-50; Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 31, and Warch, 
School of the Prophets, 40, 244, 195-96 and 186-249 on the curriculum in general. 
35 Timothy Edwards graduated MA from Harvard in 1694, whereas Elisha Williams earned his BA in 1711 
and his MA 1714. Williams was later an important rector of Yale; see Warch School of the Prophets, 132-36, 164-85; 
Kelley, Yale: A History, 37-45; and Franklin Bowditch Dexter, Sketch of the History of Yale University (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1887), 24-26.  
36 Morison, The Tercentennial History of Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, 139-284; and Norman 
Fiering, Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1981), 4-7.  
37 See Elisha Williams’s correspondence in Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 26-27. Berkeley’s education 
at Trinity College Dublin was similar: cf. Berkeley, Principles, intro, §§ 17, 20; and Lisa Downing, “George 
Berkeley,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013), 1. 
38 Two of his logic compendia are published in Kennedy Aristotelian and Cartesian Logic at Harvard (Boston, 
Mass.: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1995) 
39 Cf. Daniel Walker Howe, “The Cambridge Platonists of Old England and the Cambridge Platonists of 
New England,” Church History 57, no. 4 (1988): 472-73; Sarah Hutton, “The Cambridge Platonists,” in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2008); and Stuart Brown, “Platonic Idealism in Modern 
Philosophy from Malebranche to Berkeley,” in The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, 
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to physics and metaphysics, while the graduate studies were planned individually.40 By the 
time of his graduate studies, Edwards also explored the best library in the colonies with its 
Dummer collection.41 When he became tutor the curriculum was much the same as during 
his own studentship42 and he was also given the task of cataloguing the books of the college 
library, which enabled him to excerpt reviews and abstracts from a wide range of periodicals, 
dictionaries and monographs. 43  So Edwards’ studies and teaching at Yale were 
transformative. This can be seen more particularly from how each major area of philosophy–
–logic, ethics, physics and metaphysics––is reflected in his writings; especially logic.44 
Edwards received and conveyed instruction in logic based on longstanding (broadly) 
Cartesian textbooks.45 Edwards’ tutors Elisha Williams and Timothy Cutler used Antoine 
Arnauld’s and Pierre Nicole’s Logic or the Art of Thinking,46 which had been a textbook at 
Harvard at least since the early 1690s, so both Edwards and his father had a copy in their 
private libraries.47 In addition Edwards employed William Brattle’s Compendium of Logick and 
Charles Morton’s Logick System, which were extracted from Arnauld’s and Nicole’s textbook 
as well as from Anthony LeGrand An Entire Body of Philosophy According to the Principles of the 
Famous Renate Des Cartes and used at Harvard between 1687 and 1767.48 Oddly, Stephen Daniel 
misinterprets the logical framework to be Ramist rather than Cartesian, perhaps from 
                                                                                                                                                       
Metaphysics and Religion, ed. G. A. J. Rogers, Jean-Michel Vienne, and Yves Charles Zarka (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic, 1997). 
40 Cf. Edwards’ letter to his father on July 24, 1719 in WJE 16:33, with Warch School of the Prophets, 211, n. 53.  
41 Kelley, Yale: A History, 17; Oviatt, The Beginnings of Yale 1701-1726, 396, 289-303, Warch, School of the 
Prophets, 68, 60-69; Marsden, Jonathan Edwards, 36; and Anderson, “Introduction,” WJE 6:21.  
42 Oviatt, The Beginnings of Yale 1701-1726, 421-22.  
43 On the influence of international journals and dictionaries in general, see Norman S. Fiering, “The 
Transatlantic Republic of Letters: A Note on the Circulation of Learned Periodicals to Early Eighteenth-
Century America,” William and Mary Quarterly 33 (1976): 642-660; and on, Edwards in particular, Fiering, 
Edwards's Moral Thought, 14-23, and Thuesen, “Introduction,” WJE 26:20-28. At least forty-one percent of the 
literature references in Edwards’ notebooks date from his tutorship (ibid. 14, 110-111); cf. Schafer, 
“Introduction,” WJE 13:15. 
44 Note, for instance, the many references to logic in Edwards’ “The Mind.” 
45 On the early teaching of logic at Yale and Harvard, see the overviews in Warch, School of the Prophets, 194, 
200-208; Morison The Tercentennial History of Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, I:185-93; Kennedy, 
Aristotelian and Cartesian Logic at Harvard,  esp. 32-33, 36-37, 93-102; Flower and Murphey, A History of Philosophy 
in America, I:367-88, n. 3.  
46 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic or the Art of thinking, trans. John Ozell (London: William 
Taylor, 1717). WJE 16: 33, WJE 26:121, and Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 34. 
47 Thuesen, “Appendix C: Books with Edwards’ Autograph or Handwritten Notes,” WJE 26:423, and 
Minkema, “Appendix A: Timothy Edwards’ Library and Reading” ibid., 383. 
48 William Brattle, Compendium of Logick, According to the modern Philosophy, extracted from Le-grand & others 
their Systems, and Charles Morton, Logick System, in Rick Kennedy, ed., Aristotelian and Cartesian Logic at Harvard; 
cf. Thuesen, “Appendix C,” WJE 26:425. 
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mistaking bifurcation to proceed from Ramus rather than (at least as early as) Porphyry’s 
Isagoge.49 However, Edwards’ textbooks were clearly Cartesian and he had at least as tutor 
access to LeGrand’s standard work while he was teaching Brattle’s Compendium. Although 
Edwards’ compendium included a synopsis of George Downame’s Commentarii in P. Rami 
Dialecticam50 and Ramus’s book had earlier been a standard work in logic at Yale, it is unclear 
that it was still in use by his time.51 Even Morris emphasizes the importance of the Port 
Royal logic for Edwards,52 and Anderson contends that Cartesian logic was crucial in 
Edwards’ development of idealism.53 In this context, Edwards pursued epistemology on his 
own by reading (among others) the enlarged edition of Locke’s Essay, Malebranche’s Search 
after Truth and Isaac Watt’s Logick. 54  These works were as much introductions to 
epistemology as to logic, and accomplished the so-called “epistemological turn” in 
European philosophy from the judgment that there is something to that something is known. 
Thus the object of knowledge is ideas rather than things. In Edwards’ words: 
“We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our 
minds. We perceive or know other things only by means of these, as necessarily connected 
with others, and dependent on them.”55 These immediately perceived ideas are caused by the 
impact of atoms on our sense organs and the motions thus generated are transmitted by the 
                                                
49 “Edwards, Berkeley, and Ramist Logic,” Idealistic Studies 31 (2001). Cf. Jonathan Barnes, Porphyry 
Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003).  
50 Cf. Edwards, “Notes in Downame’s ‘Logic,’” WJEO 40; and Thuesen, “Appendix C,” WJE 26:424. 
51 Warch, School of the Prophets, 205-206. 
52 Morris, Young Jonathan Edwards, 290-301. 
53 Anderson, “Introduction,” WJE 26:24, 51, 94, 122. 
54 “Catalogue,” nos. 15, 130, 303, 313, WJE 26:121, 142, 183. Edwards used the second edition of Locke’s 
Essay from 1694 (as in “The Mind” no. 11, written June-August 1724, according to Schafer, WJE 13:94), but 
summaries circulated widely in New England at least from 1723: Fiering, “Transatlantic Republic,” 648-650; 
and Kennedy, Aristotelian and Cartesian Logic at Harvard, 97. A similar epistemological interest is revealed in the 
references to John Norris: “Catalogue,” nos. 26, 244, 664, WJE 26:124, 167, 298. On some parallels in 
Malebranche, Norris and Edwards, see Mason I. Lowance, Jr., “Jonathan Edwards and the Platonists: 
Edwardsean Epistemology and the Influence of Malebranche and Norris,” Studies in Puritan American 
Spirituality 2 (1991): 129-52. That Edwards was especially influenced by Arnauld and Nicole in the senior course 
at Yale is emphasized by Leon Howard, "The Mind" of Jonathan Edwards: A Reconstructed Text (Berkeley & Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1963). A similar and likely available source was the popular Logica sive 
ars ratiocinandi (1692) by Jean LeClerc. 
55 Freedom of Will, WJE 1:183; similarly, “The Mind” no. 6, WJE 6:340; “Miscellanies” no. 94, WJE 13:257; 
Religious Affections, WJE 2:502, 504. He is here reflecting, for example, Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, intro., pt. I; 
William Brattle, Logick, 266; Nicolas Malebranche, Search after Truth: or, a Treatise of the Nature of the Humane 
Mind, trans. Richard Sault (London: Dunton, 1695), III.i; Jean Le Clerc, Logica, ontologia, et pneumatologia, 5 ed. 
(London: John Churchill, 1716), 7, 322-29; René Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, ed. Charles Adam 
and Paul Tannery, vol. 7, Œuvres de Descartes (1642; 2d ed., Paris: Vrin, 1996) VI; Locke, Essay, II.i.1, II.viii.8, 
IV.i.1, IV.iv.3; Berkeley, Principles, § 4; and Norris, Theory, Epistle Dedicatory. Cf. Fiering, Edwards's Moral 
Thought, 26-27.  
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nerves to the brain: “‘Tis by impressions made on the brain, that any ideas are excited in the 
mind, by the motion of the animal spirits, or any changes made in the body.”56 These ideas 
are “perceptions,” “images,” “pictures,” “resemblances” or “representations” on or in the 
brain that the mind senses: “An idea is only a perception wherein the mind is passive, or 
rather, subjective.”57 Likewise,  
Ideas are images of things; and there are no other images of things, in the most proper 
sense, but ideas, because other things are only called images as they beget an idea in us of 
the thing of which they are the image; so that all other images of things are but images in a 
secondary sense.58  
This mechanical account of perception was generally accepted among scholars at the 
time and influenced semantics, so that words were regarded as signifying pictures in the 
brain––“their Audience in the Brain, the mind’s Presence-room” 59 ––that the mind 
names. Thus, according to Edwards, humans understand and attend to the meaning of words 
when they are “connecting any idea with them”, since ideas are “properly signified by 
words, naturally excited in their minds on hearing the words” and without ideas “the words 
have no sense in thought to answer them.”60  So, the meaning of a word is an idea, image or 
picture. In logic, finally, Cartesians reduced types of predicates to mathematical or 
geometrical ones, so that the predicate of substance is substituted by extension, the 
predicates of quality, action and passion are revised to those of quantity, figure and motion, 
and predicates of relation are transferred to “affection of reason” or modification of mind.61 
Edwards argues against quantity, figure and motion and thus only relation to mind remains: 
“For being, if we examine narrowly, is nothing else but proportion [relation].”62 Thus 
                                                
56 Religious Affections, WJE 2:290; similarly, Nature of True Virtue, WJE 8:566; “Of Insects,” WJE 6:156; 
“Things to be Considered,” ibid., 220, 283; “Beauty of the World,” ibid.; Charles Morton, Compendium physicae, 
ed. Theodore Hornberger, vol. 33, Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts (Boston: The Colonial 
Society of Massachusetts, 1940, 1687), 187; Antoine Le Grand, An Entire Body of Philosophy according to the Principles 
of the Famous Renate Des Cartes, trans. Richard Blome (London: Samuel Roycroft, 1694), 283; and Locke, Essay, 
II.i.23, II.iii.1.  
57 “The Mind” no. 67,WJE 6:384; similarly, Religious Affections, WJE 2:205; “Miscellanies” no. 94, WJE 
13:262; “Discourse on the Trinity,” WJE 21:113; “The Mind” no. 3, 60, WJE 6:339, 375; Freedom of Will, WJE 
1:183; Locke, Essay, II.i.3, II.ix.4, IV.i.2; Le Clerc, Logica, 324; and Berkeley, Principles, § 4.  
58 “Miscellanies” no. 94, WJE 13:258-60; similarly, no. 151 (141), p. 302; cf. no. 447, p. 495; “Miscellanies" no. 
1253, WJE 23:185; “Discourse on the Trinity,” WJE 21:117, 120; WJE 14:145; Descartes, Meditationes 37; Arnauld 
and Nicole, Logic, I.i; Brattle, Logick, 266; and J. O. Urmson, Berkeley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
10. 
59 Locke, Essay, II.iii.1, II.xii.17. 
60 WJE 16: 407, and “Miscellanies” no. 587, WJE 18:122, respectively; similarly, “Miscellanies” no. 782, 
WJE 18:454; Freedom of Will, WJE 1:152, 316; “The Mind” no. 18, WJE 6:345, 393; cf. Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, 
I.i.  
61 Brattle, Logick, 269; cf. Locke, Essay, II.viii.14.  
62 “The Mind” no. 1, WJE 6: 336.  
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Edwards is faithful to the Latin distich he had memorized: Mens, mensura, quies, motus, 
positura, figura / Sunt cum materia, cunctarum exordia rerum.63 On this Brattle comments that 
Cartesians  
are persuaded that the whole of nature is contained under these 7 classes: by mens they 
understand a thinking substance, by materia, an extended substance: – by mensura, magnitude: – 
by positura, the site or disposition of parts among themselves: by figura, motus, et quies, that which 
is usually understood thereby.64  
 
Of these “classes” only mens or “thinking substance” remains for Edwards. This 
doctrine of categories is of course also incompatible with the alleged influence of Franco 
Burgersdijk.65 From all this it is clear that Edwards endorsed the view that we immediately 
perceive nothing but ideas in the mind, that our words signify ideas and that we can account 
for perception in exclusively mechanical terms.  
In moral philosophy, Edwards’ training and teaching were likewise based on established 
texts.66  Edwards began with Henry More’s Enchiridion ethicum (or one of the widely 
distributed tutorial summaries of it), which had been textbook at Harvard since the 1680s 
(English translation An Account of Virtue in 1690).67 More writes: “I will ever follow closely his 
[Descartes’s] footsteps, unless hindered by some major reason.”68 Edwards continued on his 
own with Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume and Turnbull. 69  Cartesians 
developed ethics as an outgrowth of the irreducibility of the thinking mind to the 
mechanical operations of extended bodies. For bodily motions are transmitted by the nerves 
to the brain and thereby give rise to passions in the mind. Thus “it is not the body, but the 
mind only, that is the proper seat of the affections.”70 To Edwards and his likeminded, the 
mechanistic physiology required a new account of mastering the passions in which a notion 
of virtue became crucial: “virtue in its most essential nature, consists in benevolent affection 
                                                
63 For instance, in Arnauld and Nicole, Logic, I.3. 
64 Brattle, Logick, 270. 
65 Cf. Franco Burgersdijk, Institutionum logicarum, libri duo (London: Roger Daniels, 1637, 1651), esp. cap. IV. 
66  On the ethics curriculum at Yale and Harvard in the second half of the seventeenth century, see the 
older surveys of Warch, School of the Prophets, 195, 230-34, 239, 293-96, and Morison, The Tercentennial History of 
Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, I:258-63, respectively. For an historical overview of the geometric 
method and the emotive content of Cartesian ethics, see Jill Kraye, “Conceptions of Moral Philosophy,” in 
The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1300-1308; and Susan James, “Reason, The Passions, and The Good Life,” 
ibid., 1358-1396. For an insightful paper on Cartesian ethics, see John Cottingham, “Cartesian Ethics: Reason 
and the Passions,” Revue internationale de philosophie 50, no. 195 (1996): 193-216.  
67 Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 21, n. 23.  
68 Enchiridion, I.vii.1; similarly, Le Grand, Philosophy, 346-402; Locke, Essay, II.i.4. 
69 Cf. “Catalogue” nos. 335, 410, 552, WJE 26:187, 211, 258; and Freedom of Will, WJE 1:218. 
70 Freedom of Will, WJE 1:98, 113, 118, 132; Nature of True Virtue, WJE 8:591, “Miscellanies” no. 1263, WJE 
23:207; Freedom of Will, WJE 1:370. 
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or propensity of heart towards Being in general”.71 Accordingly all Edwards’ treatises on 
affections, will and virtue belong to the mid eighteenth century discussion of the relation 
between passions, sentiments, feelings or emotions on the one hand and reason on the 
other.72 His ethics course thus reinforced a view of the immediate access to the mind and (at 
least) prepared the way for a dualist anthropology. 
Moreover, Edwards studied and taught nature through standard works in the 
mechanistic physics that Descartes invented. 73  He may have begun with Morton’s 
Compendium physicae, which was extracted from Descartes, Hereboord, Rohault and Boyle, 
and was assigned well into the 1730s at Yale.74 (The notebook he inherited from his father 
also contained William Ames Technometria (a synopsis of Peter Ramus’s physics) and some 
theses taken from Henry Gutberleth Physicae). He continued with Pemberton’s A View of Sir 
Isaac Newton’s Philosophy and “physico-theological” writings (or tutorial extracts).75 As tutor 
Edwards seems also to have studied such works as John Ray Three Physico-Theological 
Discourses and Isaac Watts’s First Principles of Astronomy and Geography.76 Standard works by 
Rohault, LeClerc and LeGrand must also have been available,77 and the metaphysics 
textbook of Henry More contained much physics and had a profound influence on Newton 
and Edwards.78 The importance of the mathematic-experimental ideal of natural science in 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is hard to overestimate, and its popularity 
arose out of the rediscovery of the atomistic conjectures of Democritus, the powerful 
application of mathematics to matter, the renewed and rapid development of mechanics, and 
                                                
71 Nature of True Virtue, WJE 8:557.  
72 For a very good account of this, see Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought. 
73 On the syllabus in natural philosophy at Yale and Harvard, see surveys in Warch, School of the Prophets, 
208-18, and Morison, The Tercentennial History of Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, I:223-51, respectively. 
For two succinct passages of the mechanistic system of natural science, see Descartes, Principia philosophiæ, 
Œuvres vol. VIIIA (1644; Paris: Vrin, 1982), II:64, pp.78-79; and Objectiones septimae in meditationes de prima 
philosophia, Œuvres vol. 7 (1642; Paris: Vrin, 1983), 440.  
74 Warch, School of the Prophets, 217. Morton’s compendium was assigned well into the 1720s at Harvard; 
Morrison, The Tercentennial History of Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, 238. 
75 “Wisdom in the Contrivance of the World,” WJE 6:309; Warch, School of the Prophets, 210.  
76 Cf. Anderson, “Introduction,” WJE 6:22, 42; WJE 26:133, 168, 180, 183. Edwards may have read Ray 
already at home: Minkema, “Appendix A,” WJE 26:365. 
77 Cf. Warch, ibid.  212-213. For an overview of Rohault, see Dennis Des Chene, “Cartesian Science: Régis 
and Rohault,” in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
78 Henry More, Enchiridion metaphysicum: sive, De rerum incorporeis (London: Flesher, 1671); cf Geoffrey 
Gorham, “Newton on God’s Relation to Space and Time: The Cartesian Framework,” Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 93 (2011), Anderson, “Introduction” 21, 24, 111-112, and James H. Tufts, “Edwards and Newton,” 
The Philosophical Review 49, no. 6 (1940). 
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the graphic illustration of the universe as a machine or a game of billiards.79 Edwards firmly 
adhered to this view of nature:  
All bodies whatsoever, except atoms themselves, must of absolute necessity be 
composed of atoms, or of bodies that are indiscerpible, that cannot be made less, or whose 
parts cannot by any finite power whatsoever, be separated one from another.80 
He believed that Newton’s “laws of motion and gravitation hold universally.” 81 
Consistent with mathematics, matter is conceived as extension in motion, where “extension” 
means that which has such geometrical qualities as shape, size and divisibility, and “motion” 
means the local change of a quantity. As a consequence, this programme treated those 
qualities that can be described in kinematic or geometric terms as “real” and those that can 
be described in sensuous terms as “appearances.” Since the former qualities can enter into 
scientific explanations, they are “primary,” and while the latter qualities cannot enter into 
such explanations, they are “secondary”. Matter can then, according to Edwards, be said to 
have the “essential and primary qualities” of solidity, gravity and mobility,82 whereas sounds, 
colours and pains are not qualities of things but of minds.83 This mechanistic notion of 
nature established for him that the world of perception must differ from the world of 
physics. 
Last, in metaphysics Edwards studied and taught in the Cartesian tradition with a focus 
on natural theology and human psychology. According to Morton, “Metaphisicks, [is] a 
science of all beings as such.”84 There are though no records of textbooks in metaphysics, so 
the students probably relied on the rector’s lectures, chiefly a combination of natural 
theology and philosophy of mind.85 Edwards’ studies may have been guided by summaries of 
                                                
79 Cf. Edwards, The End for which God Created  508, “Miscellanies” 833-1152 no. 976 p. 286, and  Miscellanies 
1153-1360  no. 1208 p. 134, no. 1263 p. 206. For Edwards’ general high regard for mathematical physics: 
Miscellanies 1153-1360  no. 1340 pp. 362-363.  
80  “Of Atoms,” WJE 6:208; on his general atomism, Freedom of Will, WJE 1:387-93. The word 
“indiscerpible” Henry More used for “indivisible.”  
81 Freedom of Will, WJE 1:392; “Of the Rainbow,” WJE 6:298; “Miscellanies” nos. 931, 977, WJE 20:185, 
286.  
82 “Things to be Considered,” WJE 6:290. In “Of Atoms,” the primary qualities seems to be space, figure 
and mobility (WJE 6:212). In “The Mind,” he conflates “quality” and “property” and uses “primary property” 
of “matter” in the context of “solidity, mobility and gravitation”; more fully in no. 21(a), WJE 6:347. In this 
context, “solidity” is used interchangeably with “solid extension.” On gravity, see “Things to be Considerd,” 
WJE 6:234. In some of his formulations, Edwards seems to prefer Locke’s and Newton’s account of body as 
solidity rather than Descartes’s one of body as extension; see, for instance, “Of Atoms,” WJE 6:211. 
83 “The Mind” nos. 22, 27, WJE 6:348, 350; “Miscellanies” no. pp, WJE 13:188; ”Of Being,” WJE 6:204; cf. 
Locke, Essay, II.viii.8-26; David Hume, A Treatise Concerning Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. 
Nidditch (1739; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 1.4.4.3.  
84 Morton, Logick, 143. 
85 Warch, School of the Prophets, 223, 225. 
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More’s Enchiridion metaphysicum and John Le Clerc’s Logica, ontologia et pneumatologia.86 
Although LeClerc’s as well as Heereboord’s metaphysics were very popular, I have not 
found evidence in favor of Edwards’ direct use of them.87 Anderson suggests that the 
instruction was based on Henry More,88 but in view of Edwards’ writings it is clear that he 
did not adopt the distinctives of More’s Enchiridion metaphysicum and seems rather to have 
been influenced by the more common Cartesian metaphysics.89 Fundamental to this system 
is the exclusive and exhaustive division of being into minds as thinking substances and 
bodies as extension in motion: “An INTELLECTUAL substance is a thinking substance; 
or a thing where in Immediately there is cogitation . . . . A MATERIALL substance or a 
body is a substance extended into length, weadth & profundity.90 Edwards’ later study of 
Locke’s Essay and Malebranche’s Search after Truth would of course also have buttressed 
substance dualism (with the properties and modes of substances). Unperceivable substances 
exist independently and sensible properties depend on the existence of the substance they 
modify. Sensations, ideas, volitions and passions modify mind, while size, shape, motion and 
rest modify matter.91 Yet here Edwards departed from the general framework:  
those beings which have knowledge and consciousness are the only proper and real and 
substantial beings, inasmuch as the being of other things is only by these. From hence we may 
see the gross mistake of those who think material things the most substantial beings, and spirits 
more like a shadow; whereas spirits only are properly substance.92  
 
Thus Edwards revises the dualism of mind and matter in his sources to a monism of 
minds as “the only proper and real and substantial beings,” Elsewhere Edwards articulates 
his developed idealism as a revision of the exhaustive Cartesian distinction between 
                                                
86 Morison, The Tercentennial History of Harvard College and University, 1636-1936, I:258. 
87 Cf. Fiering, Edwards's Moral Thought, 21, 31. For a brief summary of Heereboord’s metaphysics, see H. 
De Dijn, “Adriaan Heereboord en het Nederlands Cartesianisme,” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Wijsbegeerte 75 (1983): esp. 60-64. 
88 Anderson, “Introduction,” WJE 6:23. 
89 The more common Cartesian metaphysics is found, for instance, in Le Grand, Philosophy 14-15, 265-66, 
320-45, and Le Clerc, Logica, 8, 13-17, 284-89, deriving from Descartes, Meditationes. For a summary of standard 
Cartesian metaphysics, see Brattle, Logick, 273, and Richard A. Watson, The Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics 
(Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett, 1987, rep. 1998) 47-65.  
90 Brattle, Logick, 273; cf. p. 267; Freedom of Will, WJE 1:188; “Miscellanies” no. 313, WJE 13:394; no. 782, 
WJE 18:453; no. 790,WJE 23:485; “The Mind” nos. 5, 11, 16, WJE 6:339-40, 342, 345; “Things to be 
Considered,” WJE 6:246, 265-66; “Of Atoms,” WJE 6:214-16; Religious Affections, WJE 2:96, 98, 288; Le Grand, 
Philosophy, 265-66, 320-45; and Le Clerc, Logica, 300-307. 
91 In “The Mind” no. 25, WJE 6:350, Edwards sets out the relation between substance and mode; cf. no. 35, 
WJE 6:354; “Miscellanies” no. 267, WJE 13:373; no. 782, WJE 20:458; no. 1253, WJE 23:185-86; “Of Atoms,” 
WJE 6:211-12;Locke, Essay, II.i.9. 
92 “Of Being,” WJE 6:206.  
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“substance” and “property,”93 Opposite to the view that spirits are “more like a shadow” of 
material things, he repeatedly defends the view that “nothing else has a proper being but 
spirits, and [. . .] bodies are but shadows.”94 Just as bodies are “vulgarly” supposed to cast 
shadows and thus shadows depend on bodies, so “metaphysically” bodies are the shadows 
that minds cast and thus bodies depend on minds. This is how material things are “by these” 
spiritual things. Edwards spells out this dependence more thoroughly: 
when I say, “the material universe exists only in the mind” I mean that it is absolutely 
dependent on the conception of the mind for its existence, and does not exist as spirits do, 
whose existence does not consist in, nor in dependence on, the conception of other minds.95  
 
Without a mind having an idea of a body or the material universe, they cannot exist. 
Their existence does not only depend on but consist in the conception of a mind. Thus “all 
existence is perception.” He continues:  
What we call body is nothing but a particular mode of perception; and what we call spirit is 
nothing but a composition and series of perceptions, or an universe of coexisting and successive 
perceptions connected by such wonderful methods and laws.96  
 
The view that a body is a mode of a perceiving mind and that a mind is a composite 
series of perceptions, raises of course the problem of how a body or the material universe 
can exist without a human conceiving them. It is here that God enters into the metaphysics 
of Edwards. For “the universal system, or sum total of existence,” is divided into “all 
intelligent existence, created, and uncreated.”97 
Natural theology was not only important in itself for Cartesianism generally but was 
also its very foundation. “In the conception of God, as in so much of early modern 
philosophy, Descartes is the seminal figure.”98 Le Grand places natural theology before all 
other parts of philosophy (following logic) in his Body of Philosophy. Natural theology “is 
required to the laying of the Foundations of Human Disciplines, and in that without the 
knowledge of God, no solid Knowledge can be had of any thing whatsoever.”99 According to 
                                                
93 “Things to be Considered” no. 44, WJE 6:238; “The Mind” no. 61, WJE 6:380; “Miscellanies” no. 267, 
WJE 13:373. 
94 “The Mind” no. 1, WJE 6:337; similarly, no. 62, WJE 6:380; “Beauty of the World,” WJE 6:305; 
“Miscellanies” no. 108, WJE 13:279; Nature of True Virtue, WJE 8:611.  
95 “The Mind” no. 51, WJE 6:368. 
96 “Notes on Knowledge and Existence,” WJE 6:398.  
97 End of Creation, WJE 8:424; similarly, “Of Being,” WJE 6:204, 356; Morton, Logick, 144. 
98 Thomas M. Lennon, “Theology and the God of the Philosophers,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Donald Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 283; cf. Elmar J. 
Kremer, “Antoine Arnauld,” in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2002), 115. 
99 Le Grand, Philosophy, 54, depending on Descartes, Meditationes.  
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Edwards: “all being [. . .] is, in strictness, only a shadow of his.”100 Every finite being not 
only depend on but consist in God, having an idea of it. In an early statement of this general 
account of being, Edwards sets out that things really are God’s ideas: 
I will form my reasoning thus: if nothing has any existence any way at all but in some 
consciousness or idea or other, and therefore those things that are in no created consciousness 
have no existence but in the divine idea – as supposing the things in this room were in the idea of 
none but of God, they would have existence no other way, as we have shown in our Natural 
Philosophy; and if the things in this room would nevertheless be real things – then God’s idea, 
being a perfect idea, is really the thing itself.101  
 
Clearly nothing exists, according to Edwards, but in some consciousness, and the 
furniture in the room as well as the material universe exist as the ideas of God. This not only 
aims to account for the existence of things that are not the objects of a human mind, but also 
to make it possible for ideas to be the only objects of human minds:  
Seeing our organs themselves are ideas, the connection that our ideas have with such 
and such a mode of our organs is no other than God’s constitution that some of our ideas 
shall be connected with others according to such a settled law and order, so that some ideas 
shall follow from others as their cause.102  
For instance, the organ of sight by which human minds seem to see ideas is itself a 
divine idea as is the human mind and its ideas. Although God was generally conceived by 
Cartesians as the supreme spiritual substance and Edwards uses such typical designations as 
“the uncreated consciousness” and “the infinite mind,”103 for him this meant that “speaking 
most strictly, there is no proper substance but God himself.”104 By “substance” Edwards 
means “a complexion of such ideas which we conceive of as subsisting together and by 
themselves,”105 and therefore he sets out his idea of God more fully in Lockean terms: “The 
notion of God, or idea I have of him, is that complex idea of such power, holiness, purity, 
majesty, love, excellency, beauty, loveliness, and ten thousand other things.”106 A complex 
idea is composed of simple and more basic ideas, and by combining the latter humans can 
arrive at the former as, for instance, an idea of God.107 However, “there is no such 
                                                
100 “The Mind” no. 8, WJE 6:364; “Miscellanies” no. 108, WJE 13:279; “Of Atoms,” WJE 6:214.  
101 “Miscellanies” no. 94, WJE 6:258; cf. no. pp, WJE 13:188; “Of Being,” WJE 6:204; “The Mind” no. 40, 
WJE 6:356; and Berkeley, Principles, 45. 
102 “The Mind” no. 40,WJE 6:359. 
103 “Of Being,” WJE 6:204; “Miscellanies” nos. 144 (134), 205, WJE 13:299, 340-41; “Discourse on the 
Trinity,” WJE 21:113.  
104 WJE 6: 215; similarly, pp. 235, 238, 344, 350, 380, 398. 
105 “The Mind” no. 25, WJE 6:350.  
106 “Miscellanies” no. aa, WJE 13:177; cf. Locke, Essay, II.xii, II.xxiii.33. 
107 “The Mind” no. 25, WJE 6:350, and nos. 42-43, pp. 360-63; cf. “Miscellanies” no. 1253, WJE 23:185-86. 
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distinction in God of substance and property [since] this is opposite to the simplicity of 
God’s nature.”108  
So, Edwards received and conveyed instruction in logic, ethics, physics and metaphysics 
within a broadly Cartesian framework, and this framework is reflected in his writings. 
 
Towards a Solution 
Edwards’ formative years culminated in his attempt to write a systematic treatise of 
what is real and in particular to develop an account of idealism as basis for natural 
theology.109 The sources of this have however been regarded as the “perennially intriguing 
problem in American intellectual history.”  
Yet, with the background of studies, teaching and research that Edwards did at Yale, his 
idealism should not be a perennially intriguing problem. For Cartesian dualism was arrived 
at by the methodical doubt that made it possible to doubt “the existence of the external 
world” including one’s body. If one can doubt the existence of one’s body, then one can 
doubt that there is anything else than minds with their ideas. Following Descartes there was 
a sustained debate among philosophers “whether material things exist” and not only 
minds.110 Among those that questioned his affirmative argument was Pierre Bayle, who 
denied the validity of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.111 Although 
Edwards had no taste for Bayle’s general scepticism, he pursued his Dictionary eagerly112 and 
likewise argued that primary and secondary qualities are equally mind-dependent.113 Among 
other authors Edwards perused, Malebranche dismissed Descarte’s proof for the existence 
of material things,114 and although Locke seems impatient with the question of whether 
there is an “external world,” he still maintained that knowledge of the existence of anything 
else than oneself and God “extends not beyond the Objects present to our senses.”115 We do 
                                                
108 WJEO 42. Sermon on Deut. 32:4. 
109 Cf. “The Mind” and “Outline of ‘A Rational Account,”” WJE 6:386-93, 396-97.  
110 Descartes sought to prove the existence of bodies and material things in his sixth meditation: 
Meditationes, 71-90. Pierre Bayle summarized the subsequent continental discussion in An Historical and Critical 
Dictionary, 5 vols. (2d ed., London: Knapton, 1734-1738), IV.654, note B, and V.611-614.  
111 Bayle developed many arguments denying the existence of extension (e.g., in footnotes G and H to his 
article on Zeno of Elea), but the one in which he denies the validity of the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities is perhaps especially noteworthy (Dictionary, V.612). 
112 Edwards had access to the first English edition of Bayle’s Dictionary from 1710 in the Dummer 
Collection and he desired to obtain it in 1724 as well the second edition in 1738: “Catalogue” nos. 234, 414, 
WJE 26:165, 213. Both entries are crossed out as if obtained, but whether he studied these passages we do not 
know. 
113 Edwards argues that primary and secondary qualities are equally mind-dependent in “The Mind” nos. 
13, 27, 61, WJE 6:343-44, 350-51, 376-80. Berkeley did something similar in Principles, 18. 
114 Malebranche, Search after Truth, VI.vi. 
115 Essay, IV.iii.21; cf. IV.xi.9-11. 
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not know whether these passages of Locke, Malebranche and Bayle had any influence on 
Edwards, but we have in this paper seen that he eagerly studied within this tradition. Several 
scholars have shown how many thinkers both on the Continent and the British Isles were 
gradually led to doubt or deny Descartes’s proof that bodies exist and affirm that only 
minds exist.116 To Edwards and his likeminded, idealism seemed obviously to follow from it. 
For starting from the commonly acknowledged premise at the time that only minds and 
their ideas are immediately and indubitably accessible whereas matter is not, Edwards found 
a basis for an ontological distinction between “two worlds, the external, the subject of 
natural philosophy; the internal, our own minds.”117 For the distinction between the directly 
accessible mind and the indirectly accessible matter, together with the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities of matter, was generally supposed to establish that mind 
and body are two distinct substances. To this ontological dualism answer an epistemological 
one:  
the body and the senses obscure the views of the mind. The world seems so differently to our 
eyes, to our ears and other senses, from the idea we have of it by reason, that we can hardly 
realize the latter.118  
 
In his arguments for idealism Edwards eliminates bodies by his account of perception 
and denial of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.119 Thus he infers a 
technical distinction between the “vulgar” and the “rational account” of the world. On the 
one hand, there is “the material world […] existent […] as is vulgarly thought.”120 On the 
other hand, the “rational account” teaches that “the world, i.e., the material universe, exists 
nowhere but in the mind […] the world [is] only mental [. . .]. [T]he existence of the whole 
material universe is absolutely dependent on idea.”121 Hence how the world seems to the 
senses is superficial, deceptive, or illusionary, whereas how the world is to reason is 
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117 “The Mind,” WJE 6:387. 
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profound, genuine and true. Edwards allows, though, ordinary talk of the world: “yet we 
may speak in the old way,” namely, in the mechanistic way of “atoms” and their primary 
qualities of “bulk and figure” and “motion.”122 However, this is just the vulgar conception 
of the world. In this way the doctrine of the direct perception of mind with its ideas and the 
indirect perception of matter is the basis for the dualism between mind and matter and the 
necessary condition of the distinction between the vulgar and the rational account of the 
world. From these idealism may seem easily to follow. Since ideas are not material and not 
inaccessible, they can be viewed as constituting the world as it really is.  
Thus it is not necessary to identify the exact sources and specific passages beyond his 
general framework to account for Edwards’ evolution of idealism; it would indeed be 
unhistorical to assume that one or two sources influenced him. Rather “nourished on an 
early diet of Cartesian rationalism”123 an independent thinker such as Edwards could clearly 
develop a version of idealism from his own studies, teaching and research. In a different 
context, Jasper Reid has similarly suggested that the common source of Edwards and 
Malebranche is “a Cartesian […] adulterated Augustinianism,”124 Common sources rather 
than dependence would seem to be the case in Edwards, Berkeley, Collier, Norris, Leibniz 
and others as they all worked within the same framework of the modern turn to the subject. 
Most students at Yale probably remained within standard Cartesianism, while such as 
Edwards and Samuel Johnson moved on to idealism.125  
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